The Golar Clean Up Trade – Let’s Get Schwifty

Golar Q4 Earnings Preview – Reorg Pressure Ramps

GLNG/GMLP Equity Thesis, SOTP Valuation:                Pages 1-2, 6
Our Expected Golar Reorg Solution:                              Pages 2-4
GMLP: Risk around Eskimo/Jordan Contract?              Pages 2, 7
DCF-Based LNG Carrier Asset Curve:                             Page 5
Asset Level Leverage, Est. Market Values:                     Page 7
Golar Power Updates:                                                        Pages 4, 8

Expectations For Golar Q4 Earnings: Heading into GLNG & GMLP’s Q4 earnings report on Tuesday (2/25), our primary focus is on (1) the timing, scope, and structure of a potential reorganization of Golar’s corporate structure – with our detailed expectations below. This includes a spin of its downstream business (Golar Power), the ultimate placement of its LNG carrier fleet, and what to do with GMLP (34% yield), (2) we expect GLNG metrics (adjusted EBITDA) to be roughly inline for Q4, and (3) the ramping risk profile of GMLP – particularly around its role in a reorg, its credibility as a currency, and (potentially) the quietly rising risk around the Eskimo FSRU contract (page 3).

*It’s worth noting that the GLNG/GMLP Q4 earnings call is endearingly scheduled to overlap with Cheniere’s (LNG, CQP), so street bandwidth may be a bit stretched, at least to the extent that if the reported numbers are a mess, the impact of clarifying (or pacifying) comments from a 10AM earnings call may be bit dampened. To be fair, we guess the reverse is also true. Should be fun.

Getting Constructive On GLNG. The pressure on Golar to reorganize its complex structure has only grown – punctuated by Luxor filing as an activist stakeholder in late January (8% holders). We think Golar likely moves to clean up its structure in the next 6 months, particularly as some of its earlier options (spinning off its LNG carrier fleet with 3rd party involvement) are likely off the table, and more controlled, in-house solutions seem more viable. We run through our expectations on pages 2-4, but here’s the punchline: We’d be long GLNG, and short GMLP in a reorg.

GMLP: Ramping Risk Around The Eskimo FSRU? The Eskimo is one of GMLP’s core assets (~$40MM of EBITDA), and is about to hit the 5-year mark on its 10-year contract with Jordan in May 2020. While it’s typically highlighted as a fixed 10-year contract, there’s actually an out in the Eskimo contract…(Page 2, 8)

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LNG Update: Coronavirus Force Majeure — Context, Data, and Exposure

Corona-Related Force Majeure: Highlights From Our Recent LNG Update

• Chinese LNG Contractual Exposure – SPA Breakdown By Counterparty                          Pages 2, 5-9
• Historical Context – SARS, 6 Previous Global Health Emergencies                                    Page 2
• NT Flash Points – 16 LNG Carriers Set To Call In China, Details                                           Page 3
• Logistical Headwinds – Trucked LNG Data, Breakdown                                                        Pages 4-5     
• Force Majeure Language – Cheniere (LNG)                                                                             Pages 10-12           

Coronavirus Puts Force Majeure In Play For Chinese Contracts: After days of speculation that Chinese LNG importers (CNOOC, Sinopec, CNPC) were considering invoking contractual force majeure clauses in their LNG contracts, CNOOC (China’s largest LNG importer – Figure 1) announced it had issued force majeure notices to their suppliers due to fallout from the coronavirus (nCoV). Total has reportedly rejected CNOOC’s notice of force majeure, setting up what we expect to be a continued string of notices and conflicting rhetoric, as the relatively opaque process plays out in a weakened and nervous LNG market, and amid the Q419 earnings cycle. While the ultimate impact of these contractual disputes is unclear – ranging from timeline delays (EPC), non-payment, and beyond — what does seem clear is that the issue should continue to build. As noted in Figure 3 – there are 16 LNG vessels scheduled to discharge in China over the next 5 business days, and we’d expect additional contractual flash points ahead.

Validity To Be Determined. We hope to get more clarity on the validity of force majeure claims in the coming days — particularly as they pertain to DES (fixed destination) and FOB cargos (flexible destinations — like Cheniere’s) which can be diverted to unaffected markets. We would think it’s less likely Cheniere’s FOB cargoes would be impacted by force majeure issues at the geographical origin of the original purchaser, given their inherent flexibility.

More Than Just A Demand Headwind In China. It’s also worth noting that Corona issues go beyond simply demand destruction within the Chinese market. Given pipeline infrastructure limitations in China, significant volumes of LNG are trucked to end users (Figures 4 & 5), which also brings logistical issues to the forefront, as there’s likely a similar lag in LNG truck drivers returning to work as those in factories and mills following the Lunar New Year holiday and quarantine efforts by the Chinese government. The risks also expand beyond volume-based LNG contracts, with shipyards, hard-asset delay schedules and tangential energy infrastructure also potentially impacted. Late yesterday gas producer Energean noted TechnipFMC had claimed corona-related force majeure on a FPSO meant for an Israeli offshore project

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It’s Barge Week At Webber R|A!

KEX: Previewing Q419 Earnings & 2020 Guidance

• Inland & Coastal Color:                                                                  Page 3-4
• Inland Spot & Term Pricing Data (Current/Historical):            Page 5
• Inland Barge Orderbook & Delivery Schedule:                        Page 6

Heading into KEX’s Q4 earnings call (1/30) we expect a focus on: (more…)

LNG Update: USG Pricing Color & Mubadala Builds Its NEXT Stake

Updated Pricing Color For U.S. Developers: Cheniere, Shell, Venture Global, Next Decade, Freeport, Annova, Commonwealth, Delfin & More. Over the past week we’ve had several conversations with LNG buyers, project developers, and downstream operators, with the more pertinent color below:

LNG Pricing Currently Being Offered In The USG:
• Consensus Range: $2.25–2.40/mmbtu – Individual Developer Pricing Details On Page 2
• Outlier: $2.10-2.20/mmbtu – Individual Developer Pricing Details On Page 2
• Outlier: Offering ~$1.75/mmbtu – Individual Developer Pricing Details On Page 2

Favored Projects: Buyer With Some Effective Baseload Exposure – In the U.S. only really considering a handful of projects (page 2),  however, Qatar is the most likely – and buyer has option to pull from Ras Laffan or Golden Pass. Webber Note: the optionality here provides another window into how Qatar is marketing their entire ~100mtpa portfolio.

Venture Global: At least 2 buyers in Calcasieu potentially going back for more LNG in Plaquemines, site visits are still ongoing (page 3).

Project Roll Ups: One buyer speculated we’ll see some of the 3rd and 4th tier Greenfield projects get rolled up in 2020, as existing players look for cheaper growth optionality and early stage projects solve for funding issues. Webber Note: we agree, and think it could start in the next quarter or two, with a Brownfield or well-funded player consolidating some pre-FEED or pre-FERC powerpoint projects.

Mubadala Builds NEXT Equity Position: On 12/12, NEXT filed a shelf registration for 10.1MM shares, controlled by Mubadala Investment Company (Mubadala) – 8.0MM of which were issued to Mubadala on 10/24 (at $6.27/share) and 2.1MM of which Mubadala acquired from another shareholder (we believe BKR). While the stock traded off 4% as the registration headlines spooked the market a bit (unfortunately, a relatively predictable outcome, even for a maintenance filing), the stock regained the lost ground relatively quickly. We view the BKR sale (via BHGE) as mostly a post-spin cleanup effort, with at least  read through here that Mubadala likely wanted more equity than NEXT was willing to issue on a primary basis.

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