Project Database

W|EPC: Commonwealth LNG – Project Update, Comps, & Due Diligence Questions (Q121)

W|EPC: Mozambique LNG – Baseline Report & On-Site Satellite Image Analysis (Q121). Baseline Report & On-Site Satellite Image Analysis – Project Owners: Total, Mitsui, ENH, PTT, etc. – LNG Buyers: Tokyo Gas, JERA, Centrica, Shell, CNOOC, EDF, etc

W|EPC: Hydrogen Roadmap – Future of Vehicle Transportation (Part 2) – Alternative Fuels – Efficiency & Safety:Trillions Or Billions In Renewable Energy – Vehicles Decide?A Carbon Neutral transportation network could require significant capital spending for a new renewable energy production and distribution systems. Some renewables (e.g. Solar and Wind energy) are variable daytime resources not available during peak energy demand. Hydrogen, Methanol, and Ammonia from electrolysis (eFuels) can be utilized to store this energy.A vehicle’s efficient use of that energy will determine the required energy production and supporting infrastructure costs.

W|EPC: Analyzing Energy Project Contract Terms – Risks, Strategies & CompsKey Takeaways:1) Analyzing EPC Risk Avoidance: Comps & Techniques For Investors, Owners, & Contractors    W|EPC analyzed ~$20B of publicly available EPC lump sum turn-key (LSTK) contracts, focusing on sensitive or contentious terms used to allocate risk, manage performance expectations, & establish a framework for third-party indemnification and liquidated damages, etc. (Pages 3, 5-7, & 9-17).  Specific points of emphasis:Investors: Leveraging a project’s future expansion plans to protect ROE and/ maximize options (ROFR) options. (Pages 5, 9-11)Owners: Finding & justifying onerous contract terms as market or on-the-run. Contractors: Avoiding those onerous contract terms.2) Analyzing Notable Risks:    Liability & Indemnity: Existing Facilities can be problematic for Contractors & expose stakeholders. (Pages 5, 9-11)• Performance Guarantees & Damages: Numerous performance guarantees were publicly disclosed (likely inadvertently) that illustrates risks & production, emissions, and/or power consumption liabilities. (Pages 6, 12-14)• Technical Risk Allocation: One project’s subsurface provisions are tighter and limit change orders provisions for differences in soils data. (Pages 7, 15-17)

W|EPC: Enterprise (EPD) PDH-2 Q420 Project Monitor & Satellite Image Review Key Takeaways – Page 2 Cost & Schedule Updates Cost Forecast – Page 4 Project Milestones – Page 5 Progress Analysis – Page 6 Project Comps – Page 7 On-Site Staffing – Page 8 Analysis & Satellite Image Review Analysis – PDH 2 Recovery Potential – Page 10  Recovery Plan Risk – Page 11 Progress Comparison – Page 12 Staffing Comparison- Page 13 ~2 Years Of Project Development For EPD – 15 October 2020 Satellite Image – 16

W|EPC: Southern Company (SO) – Vogtle Nuclear Expansion – Q420 Project Monitor – Key Questions That Could Haunt Cost Prudency
Key Takeaways: Vogtle Q420 Monitor – Key Decisions That Could Haunt Cost Prudency

• Who Will Be Getting Stuck With +$2.1B In Cost Overruns? Once Vogtle Unit 4 reaches “fuel load”, Georgia Power/Southern Company (GP/SO) can request a cost prudency determination to push their portion of cost overruns (~$2.1B) into recoverable utility rates. (Page 4)
Regulators will determine cost prudency based on project data, testimony, and a simple question: What should a reasonable manager have done at the time of the decision? (Page 5)
• We expect that process to be heavily scrutinized considering the scale of the overruns, and, in our opinion, some questionable GP/SO decisions. (Pages 4-5)

• Decisions That Could Haunt GP/SO’s Prudency. We believe there’s a case to be made that multiple GP/SO management decisions ran contrary to industry standards, potentially contributing to ($) billions in cost overruns, including
o A failure to either include or implement multiple EPC contract……(Page 7)
o For the first 4-years of the project, GP/SO used only…..(Page 23)
o In 2017, it appears GP/SO did not validate critical underlying EPC…..(Pages 9- 10)